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After onset of a cholera epidemic in Haiti in mid-
October 2010, a team of researchers from France and 
Haiti implemented ﬁ  eld investigations and built a database 
of daily cases to facilitate identiﬁ   cation of communes 
most affected. Several models were used to identify 
spatiotemporal clusters, assess relative risk associated 
with the epidemic’s spread, and investigate causes of its 
rapid expansion in Artibonite Department. Spatiotemporal 
analyses highlighted 5 signiﬁ   cant clusters (p<0.001): 1 
near Mirebalais (October 16–19) next to a United Nations 
camp with deﬁ  cient sanitation, 1 along the Artibonite River 
(October 20–28), and 3 caused by the centrifugal epidemic 
spread during November. The regression model indicated 
that cholera more severely affected communes in the coastal 
plain (risk ratio 4.91) along the Artibonite River downstream 
of Mirebalais (risk ratio 4.60). Our ﬁ  ndings strongly suggest 
that contamination of the Artibonite and 1 of its tributaries 
downstream from a military camp triggered the epidemic.
O
n October 21, 2010, the Haitian Ministry of Public 
Health and Population (MSPP) reported a cholera 
epidemic caused by Vibrio cholerae O1, serotype Ogawa, 
biotype El Tor (1). This epidemic was surprising as no 
cholera outbreak had been reported in Haiti for more 
than a century (1,2). Numerous media rapidly related 
the epidemic to the deadly earthquake that Haiti had 
experienced 9 months earlier. However, simultaneously, a 
rumor held recently incoming Nepalese soldiers responsible 
for importing cholera, along with accusations of illegal 
dumping of waste tank contents (3). A cholera outbreak 
was indeed reported in Nepal’s capital city of Kathmandu 
on September 23, 2010, shortly before troops left for Haiti 
(4,5). Two hypotheses then emerged to explain cholera in 
Haiti.
Some researchers posited the transmission of an 
environmental strain to humans (6). Reasoning by 
analogy with cholera epidemiology in South Asia, they 
hypothesized that weather conditions, i.e., the La Niña 
phenomenon, might have promoted the growth of V. 
cholerae in its environmental reservoir (6). The second 
hypothesis suggested importation of the disease from a 
cholera-endemic country. The sequencing of 2 isolates 
of  V. cholerae supported this second hypothesis by 
establishing an exogenous origin, probably from southern 
Asia or eastern Africa (7). Responding to a request from 
Haitian authorities to the French Embassy for the support 
of epidemiologists, we conducted a joint French–Haitian 
investigation during November 7–November 27, 2010, to 
clarify the source of the epidemic and its unusual dynamic.
Morbidity and Mortality Survey
As soon as the epidemic was recognized, a nationwide 
monitoring program was implemented to register all 
ambulatory patients, hospital admissions, and deaths (1). 
Each day, all government and nongovernmental health 
facilities in Haiti reported cases to the Direction of Health 
in each department, which colligated data before sending 
them to MSPP. For this study, the departments were asked 
to provide more precise data corresponding to the 140 
Haitian communes from October 16 through November 
30. Probable cholera cases were deﬁ   ned as profuse, 
acute watery diarrhea in persons. In each department, 
bacteriologic conﬁ  rmation was obtained only for the ﬁ  rst 
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cases. Children <5 years of age were included because 
age was not always reported. Community deaths were 
additionally reported by local authorities. Comparison with 
epidemiologic surveys performed by other actors (Doctors 
without Borders, medical brigades from Cuba) enabled 
conﬁ  rmation of the consistency of the database. Cholera 
incidence was calculated by using population numbers from 
Haitian authorities and mapped together with environmental 
settings by using ArcGIS (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA). 
Maps of gridded population density (8), communes, rivers, 
roads, altitude, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, 
and health facilities were obtained from Haitian authorities 
and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) website (http://minustah.org).
Field Surveys
The ﬁ  rst team of epidemiologists from Haiti went to 
Mirebalais during October 19–24. Then, from November 
7–27, epidemiology teams from France and Haiti visited 
the most affected areas, namely Mirebalais, St-Marc, 
Gonaïves, Cap Haïtien, St-Michel-de-l’Attalaye, Petite-
Rivière-de-l’Artibonite, Ennery, Plaisance, and Port-au-
Prince. These visits included interviews with health actors 
and civilian authorities and investigation of environmental 
risks among inhabitants and patients from cholera treatment 
centers.
Statistics
To investigate for space–time case clustering, we 
analyzed the daily case numbers in each Haitian commune 
from October 16 through November 30 using SaTScan 
software (Kulldorf, Cambridge, UK). To detect clusters, 
this software systematically moves a circular scanning 
window of increasing diameter over the studied region 
and compares observed case numbers inside the window 
to the numbers that would be expected under the null 
hypothesis (random distribution of cases). The maximum 
allowed cluster size corresponded to 50% of the Haitian 
population. The statistical signiﬁ   cance for each cluster 
was obtained through Monte Carlo hypothesis testing, i.e., 
results of the likelihood function were compared with 999 
random replications of the dataset generated under the null 
hypothesis (9,10).
On the basis of these results, we further analyzed 
risk factors for spread in Ouest, Centre, and Artibonite 
Departments during October 20–28 using a regression 
model with adjustment on spatial variability. The initial 
focus, Mirebalais, was precluded to better estimate the 
relationship between the epidemic spread and the distance 
to the epidemic source. Because data on cholera cases 
were non-normally distributed and thus violated basic 
assumptions for linear regression, we used a generalized 
additive model (GAM) (11–13). Furthermore, because of 
the over-dispersion of the data (variance was greater than 
mean), we used a quasi-Poisson model (variance = c × 
mean, where c is an estimated constant) (14). The use of 
a Poisson model would not have been relevant because 
the main assumption for Poisson models is that variance 
equals mean. The GAM was allowed to model the count of 
cases in each commune, analyzing 1 continuous variable 
(distance to Mirebalais) and 3 binary variables (location 
downstream of Meille River, presence of camps of IDP, 
and commune partially or totally located in coastal plain). 
The models were adjusted on the population and the 
spatial distribution of communes. Conditions of use were 
checked by using classical graphic means. The goodness-
of-ﬁ  t was also assessed by the percentage of explained 
deviance.
In the communes bordering the Artibonite River, 
namely Mirebalais, St-Marc, Dessalines, Petite-Rivière-
de-l’Artibonite, Grande Saline, Verrettes, Desdunes, 
and L’Estère, during October 16–31, we searched for 
synchronizations between communal epidemiologic 
curves by calculating and testing Spearman correlation 
coefﬁ  cients. Statistical analyses were performed by using 
R version 2.10.1 software (www.r-project.org/foundation), 
particularly with the mgcv package (GAM modeling) (11). 
We compared p values to the probability threshold α = 0.05.
Initiation
On October 18, the Cuban medical brigades reported 
an increase of acute watery diarrhea (61 cases treated in 
Mirebalais during the preceding week) to MSPP. On October 
18, the situation worsened, with 28 new admissions and 
2 deaths. MSPP immediately sent a Haitian investigation 
team, which found that the epidemic began October 14. The 
ﬁ  rst hospitalized patients were members of a family living 
in Meille (also spelled Méyè), a small village 2 km south 
of Mirebalais (Figure 1). On October 19, the investigators 
identiﬁ  ed 10 other cases in the 16 houses near the index 
family’s house. Five of the 6 samples collected in Meille 
from these outpatients, who became sick during October 
14–19, yielded V. cholerae O1, serotype Ogawa, biotype 
El Tor. Environmental and water source samples proved 
negative.
Meille village hosted a MINUSTAH camp, which 
was set up just above a stream ﬂ  owing into the Artibonite 
River. Newly incoming Nepalese soldiers arrived there 
on October 9, 12, and 16. The Haitian epidemiologists 
observed sanitary deﬁ  ciencies, including a pipe discharging 
sewage from the camp into the river. Villagers used water 
from this stream for cooking and drinking.
On October 21, the epidemic was also investigated in 
several wards of Mirebalais. Inhabitants of Mirebalais drew 
water from the rivers because the water supply network was 
being repaired. Notably, prisoners drank water from the 
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same river, downstream from Meille. No other cause was 
found for the 34 cases and 4 deaths reported in the prison.
On October 31, it was observed that sanitary 
deﬁ  ciencies in the camp had been corrected. At the same 
time, daily incidence of cholera tended to decrease. 
Afterwards, incidence rose again to reach a second peak on 
November 10 (Figure 2).
Spatiotemporal Modeling
By using SaTScan (Kulldorf), several spatiotemporal 
clusters were identiﬁ  ed (Figure 3): Mirebalais, October 16–
19 (p<0.001), and in the Artibonite delta, October 20–28 
(p<0.001). Overlapping staggered clusters occurred in the 
North-West (November 11–29; p<0.001); Port-au-Prince 
area (November 14–30; p<0.001); and North (November 
21–30; p<0.001).
Epidemic in Lower Artibonite
The start of the cholera epidemic was explosive in 
Lower Artibonite (communes of Grande Saline, St-Marc, 
Desdunes, Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite, Dessalines, and 
Verrettes). It peaked within 2 days and then decreased 
drastically until October 31 (Figure 2). On October 19, the 
departmental Direction of Health received a ﬁ  rst alert from 
Bocozel (commune of St-Marc) where 3 children had died 
from acute watery diarrhea at school. The same day, clusters 
of patients with severe acute diarrhea and vomiting were 
admitted to a hospital in Dessalines, and deaths caused by 
severe diarrhea and vomiting were concomitantly reported 
in the community. During the next 24 hours, new alerts were 
registered from >10 health centers and hospitals located in 
each commune covering the lower course of the Artibonite 
River, from Desarmes (a locality 30 km from the sea) to 
the seashore (Figure 1). On October 21 at noon, <48 hours 
after the ﬁ  rst alert, 3,020 cholera cases (including 1,766 
hospitalizations) and 129 deaths were reported. No cholera 
cases had been reported in the Lower Artibonite area before 
October 19. In contrast, almost no cholera cases were 
recorded in the communes of Saut d’Eau (no case), Boucan 
Carre (no case), and La Chapelle (2 cases) on October 20 
and 21. Only a few hamlets of these 3 communes located 
between Mirebalais and the Artibonite delta are crossed 
by the Artibonite River, so population density on its banks 
is low (Figure 1). Similarly, only 1 case, imported from 
Lower Artibonite, was reported in Gonaïve on October 20. 
Gonaïve is built in a ﬂ  oodplain adjacent to the Artibonite 
delta but watered by a different river running from the 
north.
The quasi-Poisson GAM model provided a fair 
goodness-of-ﬁ  t with deviance explained of 89.4%. Adjusted 
for population and spatial location, location downstream of 
the Meille River and commune location in coastal plain 
were signiﬁ  cant risk factors (risk ratios [RRs] 4.91 and 
4.60, respectively) but the closeness to Mirebalais was not 
(Table 1).
A strong correlation was found between the epidemic 
curves of the communes of the delta but not with that 
of Mirebalais (Table 2). The correlation was maximum 
(0.934) between St-Marc and Grande Saline, the 2 seashore 
communes bordering the main branch of the Artibonite 
River.
Spread Out of Artibonite Basin
On October 22, cholera cases were notiﬁ   ed in 14 
additional communes, most of them in the mountainous 
regions bordering the Artibonite plain and in Port-au-
Prince. We visited several of these communes (Gonaïve, 
Ennery, Plaisance, Saint-Michel-de-l’Attalaye, and Port-
au-Prince) and investigated the circumstances of the onset 
of cholera outbreaks. In each case, cholera started after the 
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Figure 1. Location of health 
centers reporting cholera cases 
in communes along the Artibonite 
River on October 20, 2010, Haiti. 
MINUSTAH, United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti.SYNOPSIS
arrival of patients who ﬂ  ed from the ravaging epidemic 
in the Artibonite delta. There, numerous persons from 
bordering communes worked in rice ﬁ  elds, salt marshes, 
or road construction. The deadly epidemic provoked a 
panic that made them ﬂ  ee back home. Soon after, their 
communes of origin were experiencing outbreaks. In 
contrast, the southern half of Haiti remained relatively 
free of cholera after 6 weeks of epidemics (Figure 3). 
Spatiotemporal analysis identiﬁ   ed slightly staggered 
clusters occurring from November 11, in North-West, 
Port-au-Prince, and North Departments, which are roughly 
equidistant from Artibonite delta. In the North, the largest 
epidemics occurred in the main cities located in ﬂ  oodplains, 
especially Cap Haitien and Gonaïve, but numerous deaths 
were recorded in the mountainous areas between Artibonite 
plain and northern coast. On November 20, almost 1 month 
after the ﬁ  rst cases had been notiﬁ  ed in Saint-Michel-de-
l’Attalaye (139,000 inhabitants), we observed several small 
ongoing cholera outbreaks, striking 1 hamlet after another, 
leading to 941 cases (including 366 hospitalizations). 
Forty-one patients died in the hospital, and 110 died in the 
community. After 1 month, the death rate reached 1.08% in 
Saint-Michel-de-l’Attalaye.
In Port-au-Prince, the epidemic had 2 phases. For 
15 days after the ﬁ   rst patients arrived from Artibonite, 
the epidemic remained moderate with 76 daily cases on 
average from October 22 through November 5, causing 
only 77 hospitalizations. Then, the epidemic exploded in 
Cite-Soleil, a slum located in a ﬂ  oodplain close to the sea. 
However, after 6 weeks of epidemic, IDP camps were still 
relatively free of cholera. Despite the earthquake-related 
damages and the presence of many IDP camps, cholera 
struck less severely in Port-au-Prince, as demonstrated by 
incidence rate (0.51% until November 30, compared with 
2.67% in Artibonite, 1.86% in Centre, 1.4% in North-West, 
and 0.89% in North) and cholera-related mortality rate (0.8 
deaths/10,000 persons in Port-au-Prince, compared with 
5.6/10,000 in Artibonite, 2/10,000 in Centre, 3.2/10,000 in 
North, and 2.8/10,000 in North-West). Living in the Port-
au-Prince metropolitan area was associated with lower 
incidence (RR 0.51, 95% conﬁ  dence interval 0.50–0.52; 
p<10–7) and lower mortality rates (RR 0.32, 95% conﬁ  dence 
interval 0.28–0.37; p<10–7) than overall Haiti, even when 
considering unaffected departments.
Discussion
Determining the origin and the means of spread of 
the cholera epidemic in Haiti was necessary to direct the 
cholera response, including lasting control of an indigenous 
bacterium and the ﬁ  ght for elimination of an accidentally 
imported disease, even if we acknowledge that the latter 
might secondarily become endemic. Putting an end to the 
controversy over the cholera origin could ease prevention 
and treatment by decreasing the distrust associated with 
the widespread suspicions of a cover-up of a deliberate 
importation of cholera (15,16). Demonstrating an imported 
origin would additionally compel international organizations 
to reappraise their procedures. Furthermore, it could help 
to contain disproportionate fear toward rice culture in the 
future, a phenomenon responsible for important crop losses 
this year (17). Notably, recent publications supporting an 
imported origin (7) did not worsen social unrest, contrary 
to what some dreaded (18–20).
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Figure 2. Cholera cases by date of onset of the epidemics and major 
related events, Haiti. A) Cases in Mirebalais, commune hosting the 
ﬁ  rst cases of cholera; B) cases in seven communes simultaneously 
struck on October 20 (St-Marc, Dessalines, Desdunes, Grande 
Saline, Lestere, Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite, Verrettes); C) 
cases in other communes. Timeline at bottom indicates 1) cholera 
outbreak in Kathmandu, Nepal; 2) ﬁ  rst arrival of newly incoming 
Nepalese soldiers in Meille; 3) ﬁ  rst cases in Meille; 4) ﬁ  rst death 
registered in Mirebalais hospital (patient from Meille); 5) initiation 
of epidemic investigations and spread into the Artibonite delta; 6) 
epidemiologic conﬁ   rmation of cholera cases in Meille; 7) United 
Nations camp sanitary dysfunction no longer observed.Cholera Epidemic, Haiti
Our epidemiologic study provides several additional 
arguments conﬁ  rming an importation of cholera in Haiti. 
There was an exact correlation in time and places between 
the arrival of a Nepalese battalion from an area experiencing 
a cholera outbreak and the appearance of the ﬁ  rst cases in 
Meille a few days after. The remoteness of Meille in central 
Haiti and the absence of report of other incomers make it 
unlikely that a cholera strain might have been brought there 
another way. DNA ﬁ  ngerprinting of V. cholerae isolates 
in Haiti (1) and genotyping (7,21) corroborate our ﬁ  ndings 
because the ﬁ   ngerprinting and genotyping suggest an 
introduction from a distant source in a single event (22).
At the beginning, importation of the strain might 
have involved asymptomatic carriage by departing 
soldiers whose stools were not tested for the presence of 
V. cholerae, as the Nepalese army’s chief medical ofﬁ  cer 
told the British Broadcasting Corporation (23). The risk 
for transmission associated with asymptomatic carriage 
has been known for decades (24), but asymptomatic 
patients typically shed bacteria in their stool at ≈103 V. 
cholerae bacteria per gram of stool (25) and, by deﬁ  nition, 
have no diarrhea. This small level of shedding would be 
unlikely to cause interhuman contamination of persons 
outside the military camp having few contacts, if any, with 
MINUSTAH peacekeepers. By contrast, considering the 
presence of pipes pouring sewage from the MINUSTAH 
camp to the stream, the rapid dissemination of the disease 
in Meille and downstream, and the probable contamination 
of prisoners by the stream water, we believe that Meille 
River acted as the vector of cholera during the ﬁ  rst days 
of the epidemic by carrying sufﬁ  cient concentrations of 
the bacterium to induce cholera in persons who drank it. 
To our knowledge, only infectious doses >104 bacteria 
were shown to produce mild patent infection in healthy 
volunteers, and higher doses are required to provoke severe 
infections (26,27). Reaching such doses in the Meille 
River is hardly compatible with the amount of bacteria 
excreted by asymptomatic carriers, whereas if 1 or several 
arriving soldiers were incubating the disease, they would 
have subsequently excreted diarrheal stools containing 
1010–1012 bacteria per liter (25). We therefore believe that 
symptomatic cases occurred inside the MINUSTAH camp. 
The negativity of the repeated water samples disfavors the 
hypothesis of an environmental growth of the bacterium 
in the Meille stream even if the lack of use of molecular 
approaches precludes detection of low-level bacterial 
contamination. Alternatively, a contamination related to 
sewage discharge could have resulted in transient presence 
of the bacterium in the water, which could be easily missed 
by punctual samplings.
Our ﬁ  eld investigations, as well as statistical analyses, 
showed that the contamination occurred simultaneously 
in the 7 communes of the lower course of the Artibonite 
River, an area covering 1,500 km2, >25 km from Meille. 
The abrupt upward epidemic curve in the communes 
bordering Artibonite dramatically contrasts with the 
progressive epidemic curve in the other communes of Haiti 
(Figure 2, panel B). In the latter, it took 19 days before 
the daily number of cases exceeded 1,000 (Figure 2, panel 
C). Suspected cholera was diagnosed in 7,232 patients 
during these 19 days. If the transmission in the communes 
bordering Artibonite had been similar to that of other 
communes, a comparable number of cases would have 
occurred in the days preceding the alert on October 20. So 
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Figure 3. Spatiotemporal clusters of cholera 
cases, Haiti (results of SaTScan [Kulldorf, 
Cambridge, UK] analysis). The ﬁ  rst  cluster 
covered 1 commune, Mirebalais, October 
16–19; the second cluster covered a few 
communes in or near the Artibonite delta during 
October 20–28; the next 3 clusters appeared 
in the North-West Department (A) during 
November 11–29, in the West Department (B) 
during November 14–30, and in the North and 
North-East Departments (C) during November 
21–30. Other departments were affected later.SYNOPSIS
many cholera cases would not have remained unnoticed, all 
the more so as several health facilities of these communes 
were participating in the MSPP epidemiologic watch. The 
regression model indicates that the spread of cholera during 
the peak that occurred from October 20–28 was strongly 
linked to the Artibonite River and not to the proximity 
to Mirebalais, as would be expected for road-dependent 
propagation. This result, as well as the simultaneity of the 
outbreak onset in 7 communes of Lower Artibonite on 
October 19, is in accordance with contamination of the 
Artibonite River in a way that could infect thousands, and 
kill hundreds, of persons within a few days.
This hypothesis is also sustained by another early 
investigation during October 21–23 that showed that 
most affected persons worked or resided in rice ﬁ  elds 
alongside a stretch of the Artibonite River and that 67% 
drank untreated water from the river or canals (1). Cholera 
incubation varies from a few hours to 6 days (26), and the 
epidemic curve strongly suggests a rapid decrease of the 
contamination level in the river because the number of new 
cases and deaths dropped dramatically after only 2 days. 
A lasting phenomenon would have induced a continuing 
increase of incidence and a later peak. However, even for a 
few hours, contamination of a river such as the Artibonite 
requires a large amount of bacteria. For instance, to reach 
concentrations of 105 V. cholerae bacteria per liter during 
only 3 hours in the Artibonite River, which usually ﬂ  ows 
>100 m3/s in October (28), >1014 bacteria are required. 
This level corresponds to the amount of bacteria in 1 m3 
of rice-water stools harboring 1011 V. cholerae bacteria per 
liter. Notably, the fact that the peak in Mirebalais occurred 
later, on October 26, when daily incidence was dropping 
dramatically in Lower Artibonite also indicates that a 
speciﬁ  c mechanism was responsible for the onset of cholera 
in Lower Artibonite distinct from continuous spread from 
the primary focus.
Besides the particular circumstance that provoked 
the Artibonite’s outbreak, other factors may have played 
a role in the severity of the epidemic in Haiti: the absence 
of immunity among the population, the higher infectivity 
of epidemic strains shed in human rice-water stools than 
of environmental strains, and the role of hypervirulent 
variant strains in provoking epidemics (24,29,30). The 
recent sequencing of isolates from Haiti exhibited several 
structural variations that are hallmarks of the particularly 
virulent variant strains that have emerged in southern 
Asia (7).
Whatever its cause, this violent outbreak in Lower 
Artibonite provoked the ﬂ   ight of persons and resulted 
in a wave of epidemics that spread centrifugally and 
overwhelmed the nascent sanitarian response. This wave 
explains the difference between the delayed and progressive 
starting of epidemics in the south and the immediate 
impact of cholera in the north. Furthermore, after 6 weeks 
of epidemics, the IDP camps were still relatively free of 
cholera. Because the January earthquake led to population 
displacement, formation of camps, and overcrowding, 
numerous ﬁ  eld actors considered that it was a favorable 
circumstance for a cholera epidemic. However, in most 
IDP camps, access to food, safe water, and sanitation was 
better than in neighboring wards (2,31). This low risk for 
epidemics after geophysical disaster was already reported 
in a study summarizing the epidemiologic consequences of 
>600 disasters (32).
Overall, this report highlights the importance of an 
accurate ﬁ  eld investigation, especially when an epidemic 
strikes a previously unscathed area or evolves with unusual 
speed, to ensure an adequate targeting of the response by 
providing a feedback to the main ﬁ  eld actors. Obviously, 
we have to be cautious with the interpretation that could be 
made from our results. Although they are compatible with 
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Table 1. Adjusted risk ratio of cholera in each commune 
estimated by the generalized additive model, adjusted for 
population and spatial variability, Haiti, 2010* 
Covariate  RR (95% CI)  p value 
Location downstream of Meille 
River
4.91 (1.47–16.47)  0.012 
Distance to Mirebalais, km  0.99 (0.94–1.04)  0.594 
Presence of IDP camp  0.10 (0.01–1.12)  0.063 
Commune located in coastal 
plain
4.60 (2.28–9.30)  0.0001 
*RR, adjusted risk ratio; CI, confidence interval; IDP, internally displaced 
persons. 
Table 2. Spearman rank correlation between the number of cases in the 8 communes of the Artibonite delta and corresponding p 
values, Haiti, October 16–31, 2010 
Commune 
Spearman correlation (p value) 
L’Estère Des Dunes  Verrettes  Grande Saline 
Petite Rivière 
de l’Artibonite  Des Salines  St-Marc 
Mirebalais 0.231(0.389)  0.527 (0.036)  0.276 (0.301)  0.480 (0.0.059)  0.563 (0.023)  0.361 (0.169)  0.459 (0.074)
St Marc  0.678 (0.004)  0.782 (<0.001) 0.652 (0.006)  0.934 (<0.001)  0.704 (0.002)  0.887 (<0.001)
Des Salines  0.872 (<0.001)  0.713 (0.002)  0.465 (0.069)  0.818(<0.0001) 0.606 (0.013) 
Petite Rivière de 
l’Artibonite
0.672 (0.004)  0.675 (0.004)  0.586 (0.017)  0.648 (0.007) 
Grande Saline  0.600 (0.014)  0.848 (<0.001) 0.783 (<0.001)
Verrettes  0.380 (0.147)  0.600 (0.014) 
Des Dunes  0.537 (0.032) Cholera Epidemic, Haiti
the reports of several journalists who linked the epidemic 
with the dumping of a septic tank (3), the exact event that 
provoked the massive contamination of Lower Artibonite 
cannot be deﬁ   nitively deduced from an epidemiologic 
study. Rather, identifying the source and the responsibilities 
falls within the scope and competence of legal authorities. 
Nonetheless, this epidemic reminds us how critical the 
management of water and sewage is to prevent cholera 
spread. To avoid actual contamination or suspicion 
happening again, it will be important to rigorously ensure 
that the sewage of military camps is handled properly. 
Above all else, aid organizations should indeed avoid 
adding epidemic risk factors to those already existing and 
respect the fundamental principle of all assistance, which is 
initially not to harm―primum non nocere.
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